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The Perpetual Battle:
Corruption in the Former Soviet Union
and the New EUMembers
1. Non-Baltic Former Soviet Union: Integration of Corruption
and Authoritarian Rule
The highly publicized cases of Sergei Magnitsky, a 37-year-old lawyer who
died in pretrial detention in November 2009 after exposing a multimillion-
dollar fraud against the Russian taxpayer, and Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the
jailed business magnate and regime critic who was sentenced at the end of
2010 to remain in prison through 2017, put an international spotlight on
the Russian state’s contempt for the rule of law. By the time of his death,
Magnitsky had been complaining for weeks that he was being denied ade-
quate medical treatment. The subsequent inquiry was laden with obfusca-
tion and represented a serious miscarriage of justice. Khodorkovsky’s latest
case gained notoriety for the brazenly irregular manner in which he was
charged and convicted of embezzling his own company’s oil, apparently
with the predetermined goal of keeping him behind bars at all costs.
In one sense, these were simply the
latest in a long list of cases involv-
ing independent-minded Russians
who ran afoul of powerful interests
and were subsequently silenced.
But there was more at work here
than mere lawlessness. More than
a decade into the repressive govern-
ance model established by Vladimir
Putin, these two tragic episodes reveal the extent to which Russia’s entire
institutional apparatus – including the judiciary, law enforcement agen-
cies, security services, and the tamed news media – now conspires blatantly
in the use of the law as an instrument of state-led corruption. By silencing
influential and accomplished figures such as Khodorkovsky and Magnit-
sky, the Russian authorities have made it abundantly clear that anyone in
Russia can be silenced.
The cases are in part products of the Soviet legacy, which includes a
dominant, executive, resilient, extralegal network, and an opaque decision-
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By silencing influential and
accomplished figures such as
Khodorkovsky and Magnitsky,
the Russian authorities have
made it abundantly clear that
anyone in Russia can be
silenced.
making process.1 However, they also contain features forged by the new
Russian leadership in an environment with far more economic openness
and international integration than during the Soviet period. It is notable
that the money at stake in both affairs was tied to trade with and invest-
ment from the democratic world. These two cases were unusual in the
degree to which they have attracted international attention. However, they
may represent only the tip of the iceberg of similar cases in the Russian
system that do not receive such publicity.
Russia’s experience in this respect is not unlike those of its neighbors, which
have also combined authoritarian governance and new sources of wealth to
produce wholesale corruption. The findings of Nations in Transit 2010, the
most recent edition of Freedom House’s annual analysis of democratic
institutions in the formerly communist countries of Europe and Eurasia,
illustrate this pattern. Of the 12 non-Baltic former Soviet republics, nine
achieve a score of 6 or worse on corruption, with 7 as the worst possible
score. From Belarus to Tajikistan, institutionalized venality is the norm
rather than the exception.
Graft has flourished in these countries, as in Russia, because the very
mechanisms that are essential for combating the problem have been bent
to support it instead. One potential anticorruption tool, a free press, is seen
by the Soviet-trained authoritarian leaders of the region as a threat rather
than a boon, and they have made control of the media sector a core feature
of government strategy. In the most repressive regimes, constriction of the
flow of information has blocked the release of societal pressures and
allowed serious problems to fester, threatening long-term stability. It has
also shrunk the space for discussion of policy options that could meet the
complex development challenges all of these countries confront.
The Kremlin’s control of television, for example, is integral to this strategy
of control. For political and public affairs issues, the three main television
outlets – Channel One, NTV, and RTR – calibrate coverage and omit what is
deemed politically undesirable. Intimate coordination between the Kremlin
and politically dependable editorial leadership at the stations ensures that
unwanted topics never make it to the airwaves. At present, virtually all of
the consolidated authoritarian states of the former Soviet Union exert similar
management over national broadcast media, from which most ordinary
citizens obtain news and information.
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1 Coulloudon, V. Putin’s Russia: A Confusing Notion of Corruption. Working Paper
Series on Russia and the Former Soviet States, The Liechtenstein Institute on Self-
Determination (LISD) at Princeton University’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, August 2003.
Graph 1.
Corruption scores for selected non-Baltic ex-USSR countries since
Nations in Transit 2001
Generalized property rights, the sanctity of contracts, and other free-
market principles are similarly frowned upon in settings where all strategic
economic assets are divided among the leader’s family members or as-
sociates. In countries like Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Uzbekistan, major
business activity of any kind tends to be off limits to those who are not
prepared to give a sufficient financial tribute to the leadership. This
approach nevertheless reflects a major change from the Soviet period. The
authoritarian rulers of the 21st century have come to understand that
allowing a degree of private enterprise and commercial opportunity both
extends the patience of the public and expands the opportunities for graft
and personal enrichment.
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The leadership’s economic dominance is maintained in part through the
manipulation of docile courts, a consistent theme in the Nations in Transit
analyses of consolidated authoritarian states. Rather than functioning as an
independent institution that upholds the rule of law, the judiciary serves
the executive authorities by enabling purges of political opponents and
rewarding regime loyalists. In cases like those of Khodorkovsky and Mag-
nitsky, the legal system has not only apparently facilitated the theft of pri-
vate assets by state agents, it has also protected the thieves by locking up
the victims.
Conditions are worst in countries where voters have no meaningful op-
portunity to hold their leaders accountable at the polls. But even states like
Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova, which have set themselves apart from their
former Soviet neighbors by virtue of comparatively open media landscapes,
civil society sectors, and electoral systems, are still struggling with the
arduous judicial and other reforms needed to make real progress against
corruption. Furthermore, the democratic advances that have already taken
place remain quite fragile, and recent years have brought a number of
setbacks and disappointments. Recent developments in Ukraine, where
encroachments on the courts, media and civil society have grown, are of
particular concern.
It is noteworthy that these three countries lack the abundant energy
resources of Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and other autocratic states.
Indeed, the most thoroughly corrupt and authoritarian regimes appear to
be those with a ready supply of external funding, whether from oil and gas
sales, or Russian subsidies. Such infusions of cash have the effect of
sustaining the leadership’s patronage networks, the security and censor-
ship apparatus, and the appearance of good economic stewardship.
Russia’s efforts to influence nearby countries through subsidies and state-led
investment have increasingly threatened the democratic development of
the new and aspiring European Union (EU) member states, which remain
vulnerable due to their shared postcommunist legacy of informal networks
of corruption and organized criminal activity. In the Czech Republic, for in-
stance, Russia has used opaque business practices to build up a significant
stake in a number of strategic sectors, including nuclear energy. This activ-
ity has prompted accusations that the country is “exporting corruption.”2
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2 Feifer, G., Whitmore, B. Czech Power Games: How Russia is Rebuilding Influence
in the Former Soviet Bloc. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 25 September 2010.
http://tiny.cc/4d3qp Last accessed on 4 February 2011.
The record of the past two decades demonstrates that economic opening
without political reform simply feeds kleptocratic authoritarian institu-
tions, giving rulers the wherewithal not only to tighten their grip on their
own populations, but also to extend their corrupting influence across
international borders.
2. New EU States: Glass Half Full or Half Empty?
Although they are largely free from the overarching, systemic corruption
that prevails in the former Soviet Union, the new EU member states are
struggling to meet high democratic standards of transparency and probity
while saddled with immature or incompletely reformed institutions. On
average, the new EU states receive a score of 3.33 on corruption in the most
recent Nations in Transit findings, far better than the average of 6.17 re-
ceived by the non-Baltic former Soviet states. Nevertheless, of the seven
indicators measured by the survey,3 corruption is the one on which the
new EU states score the worst. The overall democracy average for these
countries is 2.44.
The group includes a diverse range of performers. Estonia and Slovenia are
the leaders, with overall democracy scores of 1.96 and 1.93, respectively.
At the other end of the spectrum are Bulgaria and Romania, the most recent
additions to the EU, which hold democracy scores of 3.04 and 3.46 after ex-
periencing slight declines over the past five years. Of all the new EU states,
Slovakia has undergone the most significant negative change in that period.
A successful push to improve democratic accountability has contributed
to systems that are demonstrably different from those to the east. Most
new EU states have developed relatively strong news media and civil soci-
eties, both of which are essential checks on corruption. Journalists cover
public policy issues and often expose graft and conflicts of interest, even
at high levels. Similarly, nongovernmental organizations are able to ana-
lyze state performance, uncover malfeasance, and make their case to the
public.
The impact of a free press and civil society was on display, for instance,
during the Czech Republic’s 2010 general election campaign, in which
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3 The seven indicators are Electoral Process, Civil Society, Independent Media, Na-
tional Democratic Governance, Local Democratic Governance, Judicial Framework
and Independence, and Corruption.
corruption was a central issue. Domestic and international organizations,
including the American Chamber of Commerce, undertook initiatives that
put anticorruption measures at the top of the agenda. Czech news media,
meanwhile, reported aggressively on the topic.
Graph 2.
Corruption scores for selected new EUmember states since
Nations in Transit 2001
Corruption has persisted in the region, despite the improved environments
for the media and civil society, due in large part to stubborn problems with
the judiciary. For instance, much of the five-year decline in Slovakia’s
Nations in Transit democracy score can be attributed to the erosion of its
score on the judiciary indicator. While a number of new EU states have
made modest progress on judicial reforms over the past decade, cases of
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alleged corruption by senior offi-
cials, once exposed, rarely end with
guilty verdicts and meaningful pun-
ishments. Some cases seem never to
end at all, winding their way through
the courts for years without resolu-
tion. In Latvia, for instance, two
major cases of alleged corruption
linger in the court of first instance
since 2007 and 2008, respectively. One case concerns an affair relating to
the introduction of digital broadcasting in Latvia allegedly involving a
prominent oligarch, Andris Šķēle; the other involves Aivars Lembergs, an-
other major oligarch who has been charged with bribery, money laundering
and other offenses. An appeal is also still pending in administrative cases
where the People’s Party was fined approximately 2 million USD and LPP/LC,
a party formed by the merger of several parties in recent years, approxi-
mately 1 million USD for campaign overspending in the 2006 election cycle.
Long-serving judges who retain old habits of venality, equivocation, or def-
erence to the political establishment may contribute to this phenomenon,
and there is reason to hope that a younger generation of jurists may prove
more effective. The Special Administrative Court in Brno (the Czech
Republic), which came into being in 2003, is one example of an influential
judicial body with a younger profile that is gradually earning the respect
of legal observers.
But the failure to launch and complete high-profile corruption prosecutions
also stems from a lack of political will on the part of elected officials and
ruling parties. In Slovakia, clientelism remains an entrenched problem, as
does the gap between good laws and weak implementation. In August 2010,
Jan Hrivnak of Slovakia’s Special Prosecution Office observed that “solving
corruption is a bigger problem than any other form of crime… and what is
needed is political support to address this issue. As long as public figures
do not take the fight against corruption as a real challenge, it will be
futile.”4
In the Czech Republic, the sound legal framework is insufficient without a
concomitant change in the complex web of relationships between political
and business elites, a problem shared by many countries in the region.
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Corruption has persisted in
the new EU member states
despite the improved environ-
ments for the media and civil
society, due in large part to
stubborn problems with
the judiciary.
4 We Need Qualified People with Moral Integrity. Targeted News Service, Prague,
2 August 2010.
Major business deals involving the state often lack transparency, and the
Czech Supreme Audit Office (NKU) has uncovered irregularities that politi-
cians routinely ignore.5
The influence of these corrupt networks could grow in the coming years,
as poor economic conditions have weakened the checks provided by news
media and other institutions in some new EU states. One such country is
Latvia.
All three Baltic states have made remarkable progress since regaining their
independence, successfully reversing the effects of decades of Soviet
governance and earning admission to NATO and the EU. Latvia, for its part,
enjoyed exceptional economic growth during the middle part of the last
decade, and over time managed a number of complex policy issues, in-
cluding slowly making headway on the integration of its significant ethnic
Russian minority.
In recent years, however, doubts have emerged about the durability of
Latvia’s development. The global financial crisis exposed the precarious
nature of the country’s economic system. Poor fiscal management and a
real-estate bubble were among the ticking time bombs that went off when
the economy faltered. While the political system was able to absorb these
near-catastrophic blows, it is now especially vulnerable to a reassertion of
influence by a small group of economic oligarchs. The vulnerability of the
financially struggling news media is of critical concern.
The government’s austerity measures and proposed restructuring of the
public television and radio broadcasters could affect their quality and
independence, and the ownership of major private news outlets remains
opaque. In 2009, the national daily Diena was sold at the time to unidenti-
fied owners, and there was evidence in 2010 that the paper’s editorial line
had been affected. The non-transparent ownership transfer of Diena has
had the effect of lowering a voice that regularly spoke on public policy
issues at a time precisely when more rather than less discussion of public
affairs is needed in Latvia.
In broader terms, with economic and fiscal troubles that could last for sev-
eral years, all of the new EU member states will be hard pressed to protect
their past democratic gains against corruption-fueled backsliding.
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3. A Borderless Challenge
While the new members of the EU have come a long way from their com-
munist past and benefit from the normative influence of the bloc as a
whole, now is no time for complacency. Another source of influence lies
just to the east in the non-Baltic former Soviet Union, where corruption has
become the lynchpin of volatile autocratic regimes, and the two regions
are increasingly integrated with respect to both legal and illegal economic
activity. If the EU is to defend its weakest members and promote demo-
cratic principles beyond its borders, it and its allies must make eradicating
corruption a top priority. This strategic objective is most expediently
achieved through support for the highly responsive institutions of civil
society and a free press, both of which are now in danger.
Civil society activists are under great pressure across most of the former
Soviet Union, and as long as authoritarian governments are able to hinder
their work, meaningful headway on corruption is all but impossible. In the
2009 calendar year, covered by Nations in Transit 2010, fewer civil society
groups were willing to participate in public life in Kyrgyzstan, virtually no
activists contested the results of the country’s fraudulent elections, and
many fled abroad prior to the voting.6 In Kazakhstan, human rights activist
Evgeny Zhovtis was sentenced to four years in prison for vehicular
manslaughter in a trial that was plagued by procedural violations.7 Many
governments in the region, including those of Kazakhstan, Russia and
Belarus, continued to severely limit space for meaningful civil society
activity.
Score declines in Nations in Transit’s independent media category were the
most numerous in the most recent edition and appeared in every sub-
region. Kyrgyzstan experienced a wave of attacks against independent
journalists and a decrease in the ability of news outlets to criticize govern-
ment policies. Kazakhstan failed to liberalize its media law in keeping with
its commitments to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE), and the use of libel suits to punish investigative journalists
continued to mar the country’s record on press freedom. Russia remains
one of the most dangerous countries in the world for journalists and the
Russian authorities continue to use mass media as an instrument for
promoting regime interests rather than to inform the country’s citizenry
and improve public policy. Disturbingly, erosion was also evident on media
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7 Dave, B. Kazakhstan in Nations in Transit 2010. New York: Freedom House, 2010.
performance in five new EU member states. Through a combination of ill-
advised laws, shaky media ownership transparency, and pressures on
editorial independence, seven out of 10 new EU members have seen their
media score fall over the past five years.8 Hungary’s controversial media law
represents one extreme example of the pattern within Central Europe. The
new law among other things requires news organizations to register with
a council appointed by the Hungarian Parliament, where Victor Orban, the
country’s prime minister, enjoys a dominant majority. Under the law’s pro-
visions, Hungarian news outlets are required to respect “human dignity” and
observe balanced reporting. Fines can be imposed for a breach of the rules.
The EU and its democratic partners,
especially the United States, are
fully capable of addressing these
problems, both by strengthening
the domestic institutions of the new
democracies and by showing more
resolve in their policies toward
countries like Russia, Kazakhstan,
and Azerbaijan. Too often, policy-
makers in the transatlantic com-
munity fall prey to the false choice
between advancing democratic rights and good governance on the one
hand, and pursuing economic or security cooperation with corrupt regimes
on the other. Western officials should bear in mind that the appetite grows
with eating. The more the authoritarian leadership in the region is plied
with unearned diplomatic, trade, and human rights concessions, the more
it will demand in the future, threatening the integrity of even established
democracies and casting doubt on long-term peace and prosperity.
The injustice of the Magnitsky affair in Russia has been sufficient to spur
a number of key representatives in the U.S. Congress to take the unusual
step of proposing to freeze assets and block visas of Russian officials who
participated in this subversion of justice.9 Officials in Europe have likewise
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the transatlantic community
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cratic rights and good govern-
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regimes on the other.
8 These include: Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia,
and Slovenia.
9 Provisions of the Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act of 2010 include visa bans to the
US for classes of individuals who participated in the Magnitsky case and related
financial sanctions. S. 3881: Justice for Sergei Magnitsky Act of 2010, introduced
to US Senate on 29 September 2010. http://tiny.cc/az5qx Last accessed on 4 Feb-
ruary 2011.
seen fit to consider similar action. On 23 November 2010, the European
Parliament International Affairs Committee unanimously approved a
motion for sanctions to be imposed upon Russian officials deemed to be
responsible for the prison death of Magnitsky. The parliament’s proposed
sanctions include a ban on travel to the European Union and the seizure of
property abroad for anyone considered by Magnitsky’s former colleagues
to be connected with his death.
Just as the EU seeks to enforce its own standards in the new member states,
all democratic governments must redouble their efforts to uphold the rules
they have built into international organizations – ranging from the Group
of Eight to the OSCE, the Council of Europe, and the World Trade Organiza-
tion – in the face of malingering and defiance by authoritarian regimes. At
a fundamental level, this is a test of political will to see whose preferences,
those of the non-transparent authoritarian states or the rules-based Euro-
pean democracies, will prevail.
To be sure, this would require vigorous diplomacy and a degree of coordi-
nation among democracies that has not been in evidence to date. Some
might question whether they can afford to take this approach, but in the
long run they cannot afford to do otherwise. The authoritarian states of
the former Soviet Union have demonstrated impressive will in pursuing
their preferences and interests. The notion that the EU border will func-
tion passively as a sort of firewall against the corrosive influence of these
regimes is a dangerous illusion.
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